CVE-2023-47122

low-risk
Published 2023-11-10

Gitsign is software for keyless Git signing using Sigstore. In versions of gitsign starting with 0.6.0 and prior to 0.8.0, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures. There is no known compromise the default public good instance (`rekor.sigstore.dev`) - anyone using this instance is unaffected. This issue was fixed in v0.8.0. No known workarounds are available.

Do I need to act?

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0.09% chance of exploitation
EPSS score — low exploit probability
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Not on CISA KEV list
No confirmed active exploitation reported to CISA
?
Patch status unknown
Check vendor advisories for fix availability and mitigation guidance
4
CVSS 4.2/10 Medium
NETWORK / HIGH complexity

Affected Products (1)

Gitsign

Affected Vendors

Sigstore

References (8)

Product https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/threat-model/#sigstore-threat-model
Patch https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/commit/cd66ccb03c86a3600955f0c15f6bfeb75f697...
Patch https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/pull/399
Patch https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/security/advisories/GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc
Product https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/threat-model/#sigstore-threat-model
Patch https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/commit/cd66ccb03c86a3600955f0c15f6bfeb75f697...
Patch https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/pull/399
Patch https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/security/advisories/GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc
19
/ 100
low-risk
Severity 14/34 · Moderate
Exploitability 0/34 · Minimal
Exposure 5/34 · Minimal